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Analysis to Assess Risk in BankinG
Abstract: In the absence of accounting rules, financial reports and
disclosures were of little use to shareholders and stakeholders before
World War I. To offset the unreliability of financial information, several banks, including the Crédit Lyonnais, implemented a system of
accounting analysis that, in essence, anticipated modern financialanalysis tools based on funds statements and cash-flow statements.
This paper, based on the Crédit Lyonnais archives, sets out to explain
the purpose of this method, to present the different concepts employed, and to show how they interact. The relevance of this model is
assessed through two case studies.

INTRODUCTION
After the failure in France of a number of Saint-Simonist1
initiatives, such as Laffitte’s Caisse Générale du Commerce et de
l’Industrie in 1837 and the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier from
1852 onwards, mixed banks (banks combining both commercial
and investment-banking activities) emerged at the same time as
large department stores. They would be called “savings banks”
before World War I, having been labeled on occasion with the
rather pejorative term of “financial bazaars” [Bigo, 1947, p. 182].
1
The French social philosopher and reformer Claude Henri de Rouvroy,
Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), was one of the founders of modern industrial
socialism and evolutionary sociology. Indeed, Auguste Comte, who is widely seen
as the father of sociology, was one of his secretaries. Saint-Simon denounced the
privileges of noble birth and saw the nobility essentially as “men of leisure” (oisifs),
idle hornets (frelons) who exploit a mass of “workers” (the bees). He argued for
the idea of creating a new society, one that relied notably on re-organizing the
economy and credit and one in which industrialists, thinkers, and artists were to
lead the nation. His arguments won over a significant vocal fringe of engineers,
mostly graduates from the École Polytechnique, persuaded by his ideas of renewal
of the governing elite.
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Notably during the Second Empire but also up to the inter-war
period, they were the main players involved in structuring the
credit system in France.
The Crédit Lyonnais (CL) was the epitome of a success that
was if not collective at least pluralistic since other so-called savings banks such as the Comptoir d’Escompte (1848), Crédit Industriel et Commercial (1859), the Société des Dépôts et Comptes
Courants (1863), the Société Lyonnaise de Dépôts (1863), the Société Générale (1863), and the Société Marseillaise de Crédit (1865)
can also be added to the list. The CL’s early move away from
direct investment in industry forced it to become the savings
bank par excellence, and its subsequent history demonstrates the
significance of this decision. From this constraint, it was able
to draw its strength – the small unitary margins generated by
commercial banking operations required the bank to implement
a high-performance organizational structure in which information had to be centralized to enlighten rational decision making
and to limit risk. For such everyday banking business, Henri
Germain, the founder and chairman of the CL until the turn of
the 20th century, would put accounting at the heart of his information system.
The CL’s withdrawal from the sector of direct investment
went together with the birth of its Service des Études Financières
(SEF) (the Department of Financial Analysis). On the issue of
financial brokering, in which the CL played a leading role, assessing the risk of insolvency2 did not yet rely on quantitative
and statistical analysis methods such as “credit rating,” but instead on financial and accounting analysis tools. In this context,
the SEF’s main purpose was to draft technical and/or financial
studies for numerous departments requesting them, such as
Securities Management, Risks, Interbank Relations, Securities
Issuance, to enable them to use sector-specific information and
accounting data provided by companies to measure company
economic viability and to assess the risks the bank was assuming. The SEF also carried out economic monitoring, including
macroeconomic studies, sector-specific studies, and data collection. Since it reported directly to general management, its
strategic function would always ensure it remained independent
from other departments.
2
For more in-depth study of the issue of risk assessment at the CL, see Praquin
[2003, 2005]. It should be noted that this paper does not consider the use of accounting techniques for the management of CL itself. For a recent study of this,
see Pezet and Sponem [2008].
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More specifically, this service set up a system of “deconstructing” accounts disclosed by companies with the purpose of
restating them. This analysis of financial statements constituted
one of the major reasons for this service to exist; the goal was to
reduce the risk of asymmetrical information tied to the windowdressing that most companies engaged in at that time in western
countries such as Britain [Edwards, 1980], France [Lemarchand, 1992], Germany [Spoerer, 1998], Spain [Bernal Lloréns,
2000], and the U.S. [Dicksee, 1927; Michael, 1996]. This tool
for analyzing annual statements relied on an intricate system of
tables designed to establish concordance between the earnings
disclosed by companies and the cash flows they generated. This
cohesive set of tools predated the methods of corporate financial
analysis that were to be implemented in France from the end of
the 1950s onwards.
This paper therefore pursues two aims. The first is to show,
both in general terms and through two case studies, how a profitable financial institution came to implement risk-assessment
tools. The second is to highlight the fact that historical research
enables us to understand how some accounting and financial
concepts, however much they may be perceived today as innovative, were actually envisioned in bygone eras before being
forgotten due to the lack of appropriate diffusion.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CL
The history of the birth and development of the CL is inextricably tied to the personality of its founder, Henri Germain,3
who was to leave his mark on the bank until retiring from business life. The first 20 years were marked by an uncertainty that
weighed heavily on the strategic direction given to the CL. After
an unfruitful period of direct investment in companies, Germain
took the decision to orientate the bank definitively towards
short-cycle activities.
1863-1882: An Uncertain Strategy for Assets: The composition of
the first Board of Directors was significant in terms of both the
3
 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������
Born in 1824, Germain studied law. In 1856, he took on a position as a broker and perfected his knowledge of the business world by working in a Lyon silkmaking business owned by the Saint-Simonist Arlès-Dufour. His second marriage
was to a Vuitry, the daughter of the former governor of the Banque de France,
former minister, and president of the State Council. At 40, he founded the CL.
Elected as a député on several occasions from 1869 onwards, he was prevented
three times from becoming a minister by James de Rothschild’s veto. He died in
1905.
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multiple influences they exerted on the CL at the outset and the
ambiguity of the strategy with which Germain wished to endow
it. Among the board members were Saint-Simonists, arguing
for a new social order to be built on industrial development and
wealth sharing, who rubbed shoulders with more conservative
bankers and industrialists. What they had in common was that
they all belonged to a business class faced with a banking system that they judged to be archaic and unable to satisfy their
financing needs. Local bankers offered insufficient financial
soundness, and the Banque de France declined to part from its
traditional role as discount broker and would only underwrite
certain securities – government securities, shares, and French
railway bonds. Some hoped to obtain easier cash loans while
others sought to find ways of underwriting and circulating the
bond loans they issued.
From this plethora of expectations was born a mixed
bank, similar to the main competitors previously mentioned.
G ermain’s convictions differed according to whether his
focus was on assets or liabilities. On the liability side, from
its creation onwards, the focus of the CL was invariably to try
to attract small investors by offering good rates of interest as
the bank sought popularity as a savings bank. In addition, it
proposed demand deposits, fixed-term deposits, commercial
paper, and interest accounts reserved for banking and business
clients. Germain proved to be still more inconsistent with regard
to assets. The CL began by becoming involved in industrial
investments in the hope of making quick capital gains. This
reflected a rationale typical of economic development in the
Second Empire when large investments made large profits. The
risk tied to the amount of capital invested was associated with
the possibility of a yield significantly higher than in current
banking operations. However, Germain did not wish to relive the
disastrous experience of the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier.4
He remained prudent and dedicated the majority of assets to
discount operations which were less fruitful but much safer
owing to the spreading of risk and the short-cycle nature of this
activity.

4
These brothers founded the first French conglomerate. Also Saint-Simonists,
they had built their businesses (rail and maritime transport, property, banking,
and insurance) by relying on a bank, the Crédit Mobilier, that was in charge of issuing and circulating the bonds necessary for financing these investments. Falling
out of favor, and unfortunate in a number of property deals, they lost the support
of the political powers and went bankrupt.
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From 1870 onwards, Germain’s turning away from all direct industrial investment forced him to invent another form
of banking and to create a model that stood for the soundness
and liquidity of its investments. This shift from a mixed bank to
what would later be called a savings bank was completed in the
aftermath of the stock market crash of 1882.
1882-1914: Success in Choosing a Banking Specialization: The
progressive disengagement from the industrial sector was a success for the CL. From the end of the 1870s, it became “the leading French publicly-traded bank” [Bouvier, 1961, p. 68] until the
end of World War I. While its competitors were still embroiled
in industrial “adventures,” such as the Société Générale with its
sulphur, guano, and loans businesses in Sicily and in Peru, or
the Comptoir d’Escompte de Paris’ backing of speculation in copper, Germain’s bank took advantage of this period of slower economic growth to strengthen its network in France and abroad.
From 110 branches and offices in 1882, it expanded to 257 by
1903. From 1884 onwards, it offered new services to its clientele,
such as rental of safe boxes, and by the turn of the century, it
had also launched a significant property-building program in
Lyon and Paris.
In other words, the choice of specializing in current operations proved to be profitable in the long term. This specialization occurred mainly through the management of accounts,
short-term operations (loans, overdrafts, seasonal loans), and
banking intermediation (selling shares and bond issues to its
clients). However, such an orientation could only be successful
at the price of constant vigilance, which specifically meant finding an accounting tool that performed ever better and setting up
specialized services such as the Service des Etudes Financières
(SEF). The latter was responsible for studying the quality of requests for banking intermediation that various companies made
to the CL. In order to assess better these proposals, it implemented a system of financial analysis, the history of which is
outlined below. The CL’s strategy proved to be effective especially
when compared to other banks. Its profit margins and dividend
payouts were significantly higher that those of its competitors
(Figure 1).
The CL’s growth ensured regular increases in its profits
which rose at the same pace as figures in the main entries of its
balance sheet (Figure 2). A comparison of progress in the main
liabilities (current accounts in credit, demand deposits) and in
assets (commercial portfolios, current accounts in debit) with
Published by eGrove, 2010
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FiGUre 1
dividend and Profit rates for the Crédit Lyonnais,
the société Générale, and the Comptoir d’escompte
(1870-1909)
16

Crédit Lyonnais

Comptoir d’Escompte

Crédit Lyonnais

in % of Working Capital

14
12
10
8
6
4

Société Générale

2

Comptoir d’Escompte

Société Générale

19
08

19
06

19
04

19
02

19
00

18
96
18
98

18
92
18
94

18
90

18
88

18
84
18
86

18
82

18
80

18
78

18
76

18
74

18
72

18
70

0

Continuous Line: Dividend Rate — dotted Line: Profit Rate
(Source: Kaufmann, 1914 : 489 ; 492)

the rise in profits, whether disclosed or “original,”5 is fairly telling. The first observation is logical – the progression of assets
is in line with liabilities. The second observation proves to be
much more interesting in that following the crash of the Union
Générale in 1882,6 profits experienced regular growth, strongly
correlating to that of the main entries in the balance sheet.
In other words, the decision to increase its geographic
scope in France and abroad enabled the CL to stimulate not
5
The “original” profits are provided by Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are
defined in the following way: “the mass of profits is understood over each financial year as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’
fees), profits in reserve, diverse provisions and amortizations on dubious debtors,
insofar as these last two entries are signalled” (p. 219). We can see that in the
framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for comparing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they present hardly any difference
with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to show them insofar as they
could have provided additional insight given the considerable arithmetic variance
that exists with the disclosed net incomes.
6
The Union Générale was established in 1878 to compete specifically with the
CL and, more generally, “Jewish” finance. It aimed to attract mainly “Catholic”
savings and succeeded in obtaining the support of the French clergy. It experienced rapid growth, often criticized by its detractors. Numerous abuses and accounting manipulations brought it to bankruptcy in 1882. This bankruptcy triggered the first French stock-market crisis and brought about a series of economic
and social troubles.
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FiGUre 2
The Case of the Crédit Lyonnais: Trends in the
Main entries in the Balance sheet Compared
to Profits Made (1863-1913)
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Sources: All the entries except that of the “original” profits come from graphs
published by the CL on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary [Brochure du
cinquantenaire du Crédit Lyonnais: 1863-1913, archive hc14]. The “original”
profits are provided by the work of Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are defined
in the following way: “The mass of profits is understood over each financial year
as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’ fees), profits
in reserve, diverse provisions, and amortizations on dubious debtors, insofar as
these last two entries are signalled” [Bouvier et al., 1965, p. 219]. We can see that
in the framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for
comparing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they hardly present any
difference with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to us to show them
insofar as they could have provided additional insight given the considerable
arithmetic variance that exists with the disclosed net incomes.

only the flow of savings but also the flow of net incomes. The
quasi-indexation of low unitary profits on the growing mass of
resources (i.e., liabilities) mechanically generated an equally
increased accounting net income.
THE WORK OF THE SEF
In September 1871, Germain came up with the idea of an
office, unique in its way and never equaled [Kaufmann, 1914, p.
353]:
The Comptoir National also set up, a few years ago, a
financial analysis department. The Crédit Lyonnais’
department was used as a model. However, with only
limited staff, it cannot be compared, even remotely,
with its much larger rival. A body with this centralizing
Published by eGrove, 2010
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feature does not exist at the Société Générale. It leaves
each department to decide what information to acquire
and the data that it needs.
Even though the issue of assessing risk was a concern widely shared by the whole banking sector at that time [Bonin, 2000],
what is striking here is the importance of the role played by the
SEF in the development of the CL [Bigo, 1948; Bouvier, 1961].
The SEF was an independent and autonomous service. Depending on the case, its studies were released in single unified
documents that either explicitly or implicitly discriminated between the technical and the financial parts. One of the greatest
challenges the SEF encountered was managing to break away
from the window-dressing carried out by companies that disclosed their accounts to the CL.
Role and Purpose of the SEF: This service was responsible for
collecting and analyzing economic and financial intelligence. In
the public arena, the context was favorable since financial data
and economic statistics7 were developing and communication
infrastructures (the telegraph and the railway) could enable
their rapid circulation. It was the moment for the CL to create
added value by developing its know-how in centralizing, sorting, and organizing disparate data sets in order to draw quality
information from them and to be the first to act on “big business
opportunities” and to generate thereby “huge profits” [Meeting
of the Board of Directors, November 5, 1889, cited by Flandreau,
2003, p. 259; see also Bouvier, 1961, p. 290]. Also, it would later
enable the bank to target investments for its large clientele using
first-hand intelligence, as stated in the Brochure du cinquantenaire du Crédit Lyonnais (1863-1913): “The SEF is working for
both our clientele and for all of the services and branches of the
Crédit Lyonnais” [CL Archives, hcl4, p. 48].
The SEF periodically carried out in-depth studies that it
sometimes supplemented with reports drafted on more specific
points. These studies had several purposes. They gave the CL
7
In addition to the numerous newspapers born with the Second Empire and
affiliated to powerful moneymen (Mirès’ Le journal des chemins de fer, the Pereire
brothers’ Le journal des actionnaires, La semaine financière, which was indirectly
tied to the Rothschilds), a more independent press also developed, such as the
Messager de la Bourse, the Journal des économistes, or, much later in 1873, LeroyBeaulieu’s L’économiste français. From the mid-19th century onwards, economic
statistics developed in the form of congresses (Berlin in 1863, Budapest in 1878,
etc.) or studies, with the notable backing of Napoléon III.
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a chance to reduce its risks by knowing the financial quality of
both current and prospective clients in greater depth. They also
gave it an opportunity to improve the management of its clientele’s credit lines by increasing, maintaining, or reducing the
outstanding payments yet to be made. But, most importantly, in
the framework of the CL’s intermediation activities, these studies
enabled the bank to guarantee high-quality securities to its clientele of savers and investors. Specifically because of this financial
analysis service, the CL was widely recognized as a bank of the
highest order and soon won the trust of its peers. It often led
banking syndicates and found no difficulty gathering financial
partners around the table to float companies on the stock market and sell shares to the public. Companies also benefited from
these studies because obtaining intermediation from the CL was
for them an additional guarantee that the operation would move
ahead.
Germain had always planned for the SEF to be an independent service so that it would not be subject to external pressures
with respect to any findings in the studies it would issue. The
chairman-founder of the CL understood that it was important
to keep apart the functions of analyzing and decision making.
The SEF therefore worked on its own or provided analysis at the
specific request of other departments in the bank but was never
the decision maker. Evidence of how watertight this division was
between the SEF’s analysis and decision making by the other
departments can be found in the archives. Although it is possible to establish the purposes of SEF studies either by studying
them directly or by reading other research [Flandreau, 2003],
it proved impossible to discover the extent to which the SEF’s
findings influenced decision making by the other departments
or services receiving these studies. However, two factors suggest
that they did play a major role. First, Germain laid great emphasis on this service. Second, the periods of the bank’s success and
its subsequent decline also corresponded to the periods when
the SEF was at first considered irreplaceable but subsequently
progressively neglected.
Technical Studies: With respect to its banking intermediation
activities, for which the SEF was mobilized, the CL mainly dealt
with mining and industrial companies that needed to raise considerable funds to finance their investments. Railway companies
had no need for financial intermediation since they received
a state guarantee in 1840 underwriting the issuance of their
shares. This guarantee ensured the public’s trust and therefore
Published by eGrove, 2010
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they were able to sell their bonds directly to their clientele at
ticket offices in train stations.
The purpose of the so-called technical studies was to describe the conditions affecting the supply-chain and business
activities of the different entities in a given group. The goal was
to place a company in its competitive environment by highlighting historical details relating to the different stages of its
development by providing data on the geographical locations
of its factories and their accessibility, by assessing the quality of
different supply sources, and by analyzing the successive investments undertaken.
The purpose of the section dealing with production was to
shed light on the production process as a whole, from the mining of raw materials to the marketing of finished products. The
SEF did not lack the elements of comparison as it produced
data and statistics on both the company under scrutiny and its
competitors. The SEF was in a position to refer to sector-specific
information gathered from the annual public reports published
by the Ingénieurs des Mines and to compare them with data
disclosed, it appears, in a company’s accounting of its internal
costs. On this point, however, we should be cautious because the
precision of certain calculations may lead us to assume that the
only possible source was the company itself. Yet, at other times,
precise data are missing either because the CL had not received
them or the company was unable to provide them. As we will
see later, the bank analyzed the accounting for net income using
gross operating profit without knowing how it had been reached.
These data therefore essentially appear to stem from excellent
knowledge of the sector and timely investigations within the
company itself as a number of reports about on-site visits testify.
These data allow us to suggest that cost accounting and financial
accounting were totally decoupled. In the event that precise data
were lacking, the auditor would extrapolate from past indicators.
Financial Studies: The financial studies contained a descriptive
part drawing together the various elements that formed their
basis, the considerable work of restating accounting data that
department staff conducted upstream. These financial reports
detailed how the main accounting items were established (acquisitions, sell-offs, content), described the accounting methods
used (measuring inventories, amortization policy), and assessed
the pertinence of dividend payouts by comparing them with the
profits generated. The reports concluded with a valuation of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
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the share price that was calculated, depending on the case, by a
measurement (specific to the SEF) of the company’s assets, by
capitalizing dividends, or by simulating forced bankruptcy.
Yet, the most notable feature during this turn-of-the-century
period of transition resided in the considerable work of restating
and analyzing accounting data disclosed on a company’s balance
sheet, income statement, and corresponding reports. By first deconstructing and then reconstructing the financial statements
provided by companies, the analysts at the CL sought to forge
their own opinion on the “veracity” (the term used at that time)
of the net income disclosed by comparing the company’s figures
with net incomes reached using their own methods.
The dual aim of the SEF was to break away from the uncertainties associated with the disclosed accounts and to implement
a homogeneous method of restating accounting data that offered
several advantages – standardizing processes for producing restated data, generating economies of scale, ensuring soundness
in decision making, minimizing risk, and creating internal technical competencies.
Issues Relating to Disclosed Accounts: The lack of homogeneity
in corporate accounting practices constituted the major challenge facing the SEF. This situation arose due to the following
phenomenon. In the absence of any accounting standards, the
lack of standardization of key concepts, such as those relating
to calculated cash flow8 or to the recognition of rules defining
assets as opposed to expenses, raised difficulties in interpreting the same economic situation. In order to enable translation
into accounting terms, this situation led to the use of numerous
accounts that worked differently. In other words, assets might
be charged indiscriminately either to the balance sheet or the
income statement, and depreciations might or might not be
recorded according to the ultimate configuration that company
boards sought to give to their financial statements.
More specifically for the CL, it was statements of investments (whether assets or expenses) that posed the greatest
difficulty for interpretation. The SEF had little information at
its disposal that enabled it to know the criteria that a company
8
 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������
This is stretching the current classical distinction between calculated expenses and paid expenses to cover all accounting movements that do not result in
a monetary flow, owing to the facts that amortizations, provisions, and reserves
fulfil analogous functions and that the accounting distinctions conceptually established today did not exist at that time.
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was following in improving, transforming, or acquiring an investment and whether such an investment was an asset or an
expense. Echoing this issue was the question of how expenditure on fixed assets was amortized. The methods most often
encountered were industrial amortization expenses, depletion of
a reserve account created for this purpose, and assets charged to
other reserve accounts or to accounts made of matured bonds.
The corollary of this was the deduction of depreciation from the
fixed-asset account in question.
Nevertheless, by examining reports disclosed with annual
statements, CL analysts were able to identify the different types
of accounting used by companies to state the fall in value of
their investments. Above and beyond the existence of statutory
amortization (most commonly either a rate of one fifth or a fixed
amount, both recorded as a drop in the gross operating profit),
companies turned to other ways of accounting for amortizations
that evaded disclosure in the profit-and-loss account. Thus, the
Compagnie des Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt
did not hesitate to multiply and blend the different options that
were open to it. From 1856 to 1860, it set up a reserve amortization fund that was both charged and depleted at the same time
over its financial years. Subsequently, this account remained
relatively inactive until the 1880s when once again it began to
be depleted. In 1867, it added an insurance fund that, according
to CL annotations, did not undergo any transactions other than
in 1869 and in 1872. Furthermore, being able to charge bond
reimbursements to the profit-and-loss account created de facto
supplementary reserves that could be used for future amortizations. This was the case from 1869 to 1887 and then from 1908
to 1919. Reserves could also be merged.
Faced with the impossible task of formulating an exact idea
of what fixed-asset and stockholder-equity accounts contained,
the SEF developed a statement that, although unable to provide
precise information on asset purchases and sales (charged to
fixed-asset accounts at sale price), enabled the SEF to know
the variations in fixed assets between one financial year and
another.
THE SEF METHOD: THE WORK OF RESTATING ACCOUNTS
Until the inter-war period, the diversity of accounting practices made it difficult for a third party to utilize accounts disclosed by companies. The SEF therefore set out very early on to
conduct technical and financial studies which, thanks to an accounting and financial method, allowed it to formalize a certain
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
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number of restatements so as to measure better the net incomes
of companies with which the CL wished to maintain or develop
a business relationship.
To compensate for the lack of reliability in disclosed accounts, the CL set up a coherent system of financial analysis
based on two financial concepts, excess working capital and
gross operating profit, which hinged on the key concept of “new
works” (travaux neufs). However, the relevance of this model
depended on prior work on restating disclosed accounts using
formalized statements with a number of articulations.
A Key Concept: Calculating “New Works”: The CL performed most
of its financial brokerage business with industrial companies
that were required to reinvest relentlessly in order to remain
competitive. These investments, named “new works” by the SEF,
weighed heavily on the profitability of these companies which,
to improve the financial picture portrayed in their operating
statement, cut amortization expenses by transferring them, in
all or in part, onto their balance-sheets accounts. The goal of
the analysts at the CL was therefore to acquire a reliable and
homogeneous performance indicator. The intent was to break
away from window-dressing that might alter the impact of “new
works” on net income.9 Building such an indicator presupposed
having already identified and isolated all the accounting items
that contribute to making up these “new works.”
“New works” were therefore calculated on the basis of the
variation in net fixed assets to which were added all the decreases that the company had experienced during the financial year.
These were added in the form of asset sales or amortizations
charged to the different items of equity (profits, reserves, capital,
amortized bonds). The calculated figure reached constituted the
“new works in the financial year” (travaux neufs de l’exercice).
The “new works in the financial year” could then either be
charged in total to gross operating profit in order to attain, following other restatements, the profits and losses for the period
9
The SEF auditors did not fail to inform Germain of the impact of new works
on the accounting income. In a letter dated March 4, 1902 addressed to the chairman of the CL, Lucien Rolland d’Estape clearly states, with respect to the Compagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et des Chemins de Fer:
“I have compared turnover with gross profit, from which overheads have been
deducted, but not with the net operating profit, so that the percentage would be
free from the accidental variations that arise from the difference, often significant from one year to the next, in the amount of new works” [CL Archive, deef
23828].
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according to the SEF method. They could also be used to compare the profits disclosed by the company and the profits calculated using the SEF method.
In other words, analysts at the CL rejected all capitalization
of “new works” and treated them as definitive expenses. In this
way, they broke away from the accounting dualism (charging to
the profit-and-loss account and/or to the balance sheet) that was
being exploited by companies. Consequently, they could develop
their own accounting for net income (indifferently called profits
and losses or total net profits), calculated on the basis of variations in overall cash flows (called excess working capital) which
was subsequently compared with the gross operating profit.
Yet, “new works” were not just intermediary amounts; they
too were subjected to analysis in the reports. They were generally used to assess the level of investment carried out during a financial year, and their impact was accounted for in the analysis
of the amount of profits disclosed.
Financial Concepts – Variation in Excess Working Capital and
Gross Operating Profit: Analysts at the CL were interested in
knowing their clients’ performance and thereby assessing the
profitability of their companies. However, to achieve this end,
they had to possess reliable measurement indicators and, better
still, by deploying alternative calculation processes, to be able
to cross-check their figures by reaching identical net-income
results. For these reasons, as already stated, the SEF set out to
measure net income using two different concepts – variation in
excess working capital and gross operating profit.
Variation in excess working capital requires a brief detour
to look at the underlying notion, namely “working capital,” a
term coined during the 19th century but employed in different
[Batsch, 1995, p. 15] or even contradictory [Lemarchand, 1993,
pp. 366, 569] ways. Within the CL, this expression (still commonly found in the form of “revolving fund” in the 1870s) exclusively denoted current assets that, in addition to inventories,
accounts receivable, and cash accounts, also generally included
the portfolio of shares and bonds.
An essential sign of the asset liquidity in which the CL was
particularly interested, the analysis of working capital constituted a significant part of the comments found in the reports. After
each constituent item was broken down in detail and justified as
to its makeup and measurement, the report concluded with an
assessment of its reliability and liquidity. The underlying idea
was to ensure that once fixed assets were covered by sufficient
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
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reserves, the working capital exceeded current liabilities, itself
composed of the “floating” debt (i.e., revolving debt) and, less
commonly, the “consolidated” debt (i.e., bonds payable). Shorn
of inventories, and sometimes of shares and bonds, the excess
working capital then became “immediate available assets”
(short-term liquidity), as shown in Figure 3.
FiGUre 3
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The aim of the diagram is to show that the SEF calculated
the performance of a company based on its capacity to generate
cash flows. The particularity of the system is that potential net
cash flows are calculated on the basis of the fictive liquidation
of immediately available assets and liabilities. In a historical
context where liquidity was rare and the banking system underdeveloped, the CL, which was mainly a short-term lender,
sought to ensure that its clients could face their short-term commitments, even in the most difficult situations (i.e., bankruptcy).
Furthermore, fixed assets were considered as being difficult for
the CL to mobilize. For this reason, it accorded them little importance and sought to “neutralize” them by ensuring only that
they were covered with sufficient reserves. To mark clearly this
conceptual difference between the long and the short terms, the
diagram distinguishes between these two elements, whereas the
CL only focused on the short term. Calculation of this liquidity,
performed in successive stages, was accompanied by an assessment of the overall situation which, to foster comparison, was
reported in tonnage produced or per business operation.
Measured by its variation and after restatement of operations having no impact on the operating statement (sales of fixed
assets, increases in capital, and dividend payouts), the excess
working capital constitutes an interesting indicator of a company’s cash flow in that, with its very mode of calculation free from
potential window-dressing carried out on the profit-and-loss
account, represents sound liquidity flows capable of confirming
the reliability of disclosed profits.
Net income calculated on the basis of the variation in excess
working capital is also measured using the gross operating profit
disclosed in the company’s accounts. However, since the CL did
not dispose of any information regarding how it was made up
(disclosed profit-and-loss accounts shifted seamlessly from turnover to gross profit), calculations on the basis of gross operating
profit had only one purpose. That was to ensure the coherence
of the whole financial-analysis system by obtaining a net-income
figure identical to the one determined using the variation in excess working capital. The discretionary character of profit-andloss account disclosure at that time, the limited confidence the
CL had in its reliability, and the clear preference for the balance
sheet owing to its capacity to measure the company’s solvency
meant that the former received much less comment in the reports.
Analysis Statements – Possible Articulations and Cross-Checking:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
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It would appear that this coherent and complete system of financial and accounting analysis emerged with the creation of
the SEF in 1871. The first studies based on summary statements
date from the early years of that decade. Although the archives
consulted do not always provide a totally identical number
of statements for each company (either because some were
deemed unnecessary or because others have been lost or were
left unfinished for lack of information), their composition varied
little from one company to the next. This may be seen as a sign
that there was a real desire to standardize analysis beyond the
particular choices made by each company.
The following statements served as a basis for the SEF’s
work:
• Presenting the balance sheet, operating statement, and
profit-and-loss account, as they were disclosed by a company, but adapted to an internal CL matrix which, notably, allowed working capital to be measured and excess
working capital easily calculated.
• Drafting intermediary statements (investment expenditure, calculation of net profit using excess working capital, and a linking statement) ensuring the link between
the company’s accounts and those assessed by the CL
on the one hand and, on the other, profits calculated on
excess working capital and operating profits.
• Drafting the revised balance sheet, operating statement,
and profit-and-loss account calculated by the SEF in the
previous two steps.
This three-stage, account-restatement procedure was based
on significant levels of theoretical thinking. In addition to crosschecking consistency, the fundamental relationships that the CL
established between net profit and excess working capital should
be highlighted. A breakdown of these two concepts, with respect
to modern techniques of financial analysis based on the funds
statement and developed by the French Plan Comptable Général
in 1982, illustrates the relevance of this approach (Appendix I).
In other words, the SEF succeeded in reaching a profit
figure based solely on cash flows while ensuring that this result
could be compared with the figure disclosed by the company using its linking statement. This method enabled the CL to make a
clean break from the variety of ways used to account for investments whose impact on the disclosed profit it could not control.
However, it should be noted that although analysts at the CL
effectively succeeded in building a coherent system for examining accounts, they were still limited in their ability to comment
Published by eGrove, 2010
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on variations arising from one financial year to another without
ever putting them into the perspective of a conceptual framework as has been done in this analysis. The concordance they
established was aimed more at ensuring the coherence of the
system and the reliability of the net profit figure than at constituting a tool for analyzing variations in corporate financing.
Furthermore, this net-profit figure, free from the uncertainties
tied to the variety of methods used to account for investments,
was not developed any further in the commentaries.
In fact, their goal was two-fold. From an organizational
viewpoint, it was a question of seeking to break away from the
plethora of accounting practices in order to formalize common
methods at the CL. From a technical viewpoint, it was a question of isolating the flows of operating liquidity10 (variation in
excess working capital) from the major impact of internally financed investments so that the reliability of the net-profit figure
calculated on the basis of balance-sheet items could be verified.
This paper has sought to push this reasoning to its logical
conclusion in order to test the relevance of the model and to
show that in the final analysis, such theoretical thinking proves
to be very close to current tools of analysis such as the funds
statement or cash-flow statement.
MEASURING NET INCOMES: THE IMPACT OF
RESTATEMENTS
The next step is to measure the impact of restatements carried out by the SEF on disclosed net incomes. The interest of
measuring this impact is to ensure that the main cause of variance between earnings disclosed by companies in a business relationship with the CL and the results calculated by the SEF are
due to the different ways of stating investments (“new works”).
To do this, four types of calculation have been carried out:
(i) a comparison between the annual levels of profit determined by the SEF and the annual levels of profit
disclosed by companies. The aim is to show the impact
of the accounting statement relating to “new works” on
the level of earnings.
(ii) the same comparison using a moving average over nine

10
The term “operating” should be understood in its broadest sense; that is,
free from the impact of investment expenditure and not compared with other
forms of income (e.g., financial or extraordinary) which would make no sense at a
time when modern distinctions were completely unformalized.
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years.11 The aim is to determine whether the variances
smooth out over time and do indeed stem from the accounting statement relating to “new works.”
(iii) a comparison (SEF vs. company) between the variance
in amortizations and the variance in profits in order to
ensure that it is indeed the accounting statement including the “new works” that has an impact on the net
income disclosed by companies
(iv) the same comparison using a moving average over nine
years
The present analysis was carried out using case studies
based on the annual accounts of two companies, one of which,
the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye, had a precarious financial balance
that tended to worsen at the turn of the 20th century. The other,
the Compagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, des Forges et Aciéries de la
Marine et d’Homécourt, maintained sustained growth up to the
eve of World War I. However, due to a lack of data over time,
only the first calculation could be carried out in the case of the
Société de Vezin-Aulnoye.
With regard to the comparison of annual profits, we can
observe that short and stable periods present fewer variances
between disclosed profits and those calculated by the CL as
testified by the regularity of the figures reached during the
years 1884-1890. In contrast, over a short and turbulent period
(financial difficulties facing the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye or conjunctural growth12 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt over the previous decade), the CL method tended to increase the variances
between the figures calculated by the SEF and those disclosed
by the company (Figures 4 and 5).
The differences observed were significant. The variance
between profit figures calculated by the CL and disclosed profit
amounted to 67% for the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye from 18891890 to 1901-1902, and 306% for the Compagnie d’Homécourt
over the years 1907-1919. Whereas companies, such as VezinAulnoye, could limit industrial amortizations (i.e., those that the
11
In order to avoid superimposing the graphs and to facilitate their reading,
the moving average is calculated on the basis of half of the average lifespan of
investments carried out by the companies.
12
“Repercussions from the international crisis were only felt at the end of
1907 and the industrial recession was only slight....Europe remained unaffected
by the American slowdown of 1910-1911.... Industrial production would exceed,
in 1913, the 1908 level by 32%; the increase rose to 58% for the steel industry, 65%
for the mechanics industry while production of potash doubled” [Flamant, 1976,
pp. 329-331].
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FiGUre 4
Comparison of C.L. net Profits - Cie des hauts-Fourneaux…
d’homécourt disclosed net Profits (1856-1919)
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company recorded in its profit-and-loss accounts) to reduce the
impact on their bottom line of a conjuncture or unsuccessful
management, CL’s restatement of “new works” had the effect
of erasing the smoothing effect caused by amortizations of the
disclosed accounts and of increasing the variances between the
two forms of net incomes. Conversely, periods of strong growth,
such as that experienced by the Compagnie d’Homécourt between 1916 and 1919, were used by the companies to increase
their amortization expenses and therefore to reduce their net
incomes, with the effect of stimulating the net profit calculated
by the SEF. In other words, during stable cycles, disclosed net
incomes and the CL’s net incomes were similar, whereas in turbulent periods they seemed to diverge significantly.
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In this sense, the SEF-implemented statements constituted
effective alarm indicators for risk because they enabled the SEF
to state the real level of a company’s activity based on its cash
flow rather than on its disclosed earnings, the object of much
manipulation. The CL could then adjust its commitments (shortterm operations and financial intermediation) with a better understanding of its clients’ financial situations.
Over the longer term, the SEF restatements had a minor
impact, and the figures calculated on both sides tended to balance out (Figure 6). The cumulated profits calculated by the CL
differ from the figures disclosed by the Compagnie d’Homécourt
by only 5%, whereas the extreme variances were 0.64% in 1878
and 119% in 1918. Such a mild impact is logical because both
the method of amortizing “new works” used in the disclosed
accounts and the CL’s method of charging them globally had,
in the end, an identical effect on profit levels. Moreover, this
method offered little of interest to a managerial approach of
forecasting risk and preferring liquidity. What mattered most
to the CL was the predictability in the short and, in due course,
medium term.
FiGUre 6
Comparison of C.L. net Profits - Cie des hauts-Fourneaux…
d’homécourt disclosed net Profits (1856-1919) rolling Average over 9 years
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The last interesting element to analyze is the impact of restating “new works” on the net income. To this end, it suffices
to compare for each financial year the variance in amortizations with the variance in net profit. Indeed, if the two variances
have a similar movement, it means that the main source of
divergence between the two forms of net income arises from the
restatement (amortizations or “new works”) of investments. The
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first is calculated by measuring the difference between disclosed
amortizations and amortizations calculated by the CL (potential
amortizations and “new works”); the second by deducting from
the disclosed profits those calculated by the CL.
In the stable short term, variances in amortizations are
shown to be close to variances in profits, but the difference rises
in periods of instability, regardless of whether they were profitable like in the period 1916-1919 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt
(Figure 7). Over the longer term, as measured using rolling
averages, the variances balance out (Figure 8). Differences in
amortizations (6%) are not far at all from those in profits (5%).

FiGUre 7
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This close correlation confirms that the issue of “new works”
constituted the main source of concealment of profit or loss by
companies. For the CL, it was therefore important to know the
impact of these investments on its clients’ earnings since a low
level of cash flow could be an indication of a lower performance
and of an increased risk of failure. This type of information gave
it a competitive advantage as it could better select its clients, reduce its risks, and improve its financial performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper confirms the importance that companies have
always given to cash flows to estimate the viability and reality
of an economic activity [Lemarchand, 1992]. It also enables us
to shed new light on the expectations of a creditor bank. Faced
with a plethora of uncontrollable accounting practices, the bank
pushed its rationale to its limit, considering any investment
as an expense, by building a technical system that enabled the
CL to verify the sincerity and the regularity of the accounts
submitted for its inspection (cross-checking the net income by
two methods). It also satisfied the preference for liquidity for
which it had consistently argued. By implementing this type of
accounting restatement, the SEF succeeded in achieving the first
goal set by the founder of the CL – detecting as effectively as
possible the risk of insolvency of any company seeking to build
a business relationship with this top-tier bank. This study also
shows that the issue of financing constitutes a central pillar of
measuring and controlling the real performance of a company
and demonstrates how close the CL method was to the modern
concept of “free cash flow” (operating cash flow – capital expenditures – dividends paid out).
Reliance on such account analysis fell after the war. We
might assume that the development of medium and long-term
bank financing and the fall in corporate internal financing from
the inter-war period were the causes of this decline. However,
this argument does not apply directly. In many countries, funds
statements emerged very early on by whatever means companies
financed their activities.
In the U.S., the funds statement emerged as early as 1863,
taking on numerous forms until 1925 when these converged
in the concept of variation in working capital [Rosen and DeCoster, 1969]. This form then developed towards the statement
of changes in financial position [APB 19, 1971] and then the
cash-flow statement [SFAS 95, 1984]. In France, the first funds
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s tatements appeared at the end of the 1950s taking multiple
forms until the Plan Comptable Général of 1982 which highlighted the relation between net global working capital (working
capital + amortizations and provisions + long-term liabilities
– gross investments), working-capital requirements (inventories
+ creditors – debtors), and cash and cash equivalents [Hoarau,
1995]. On an international level, this change mirrored the one
seen in the U.S. where the statement of changes in financial position of 1977 was replaced on January 1, 1994 by the cash-flow
statement.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note a recurrence of the
same issues among those who instigate such tools [Hoarau,
1995]. In the first phase, they seek to highlight the risk of liquidity. In the second phase, their goal is to account for the set of
movements that affect the financial situation by focusing more
specifically on the issue of structural financing. In the third
phase, they return to the issue of measuring solvency, this time
through a more in-depth analysis of cash flows split between
operations, investments, and financing.
The tool implemented by the CL and described in this paper arose from the first phase. However, it is interesting to note
that its technical construction is close to tools implemented in
France in the second phase. Furthermore, the CL may be seen
as a long-forgotten forerunner in the French context, whereas
this type of tool had already seen relatively widespread use in
the U.S.
Yet, at the dawn of the 21st century, it is surprising to hear
echoes of concepts confidentially developed within the CL more
than a century before: “ ‘We have observed significant divergen
ces between cash flow caused by operations and disclosed net
incomes, which sounds the alarm for potential profit manipulation,’ explains the company [Weiss Ratings] that has studied
7,000 companies” [Fay, 2002, p. 3].
The European Commission [1997, p. 8] shares this position:
This additional angle of observation [cash-flow statements] is deemed very useful by most users and preparers, because it is not influenced by accruals and
matching and therefore does not involve conventions
and estimates. It may also enhance the comparability
of the reporting of operating performances by different
enterprises, as it eliminates most of the effects of using different account treatments for the same transactions and events.The joint use of cash flow statements,
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts also helps
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
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users in better evaluating the changes in net assets of
an enterprise and its financial structure (including its
liquidity and solvency), as well as its ability to affect the
amounts and timing of cash flows in order to adapt to
changing circumstances and opportunities. Morevover,
this may allow a better assessment of the quality of the
profits reported.
However, it should be noted that de-consolidation operations today enable unfavorable movements of cash flow to be
concealed. Yet, the first consolidated statements only appeared
at the end of the 19th century in the U.S. In France, several
scholars commented on consolidation during the inter-war period, but the first practices only became manifest in the 1950s.
In the absence of (de)consolidation, the method used by the SEF
proved to be very effective for assessing cash-flow movements in
the balance sheets it analyzed.
One final question remains – why did the CL method disappear? The most probable motive for the SEF’s gradual move
away from accounting and financial-restatement tables was the
fact that the tax administration stipulated as a precondition for
deducting amortizations from taxable income that amortizations be recorded as expenses. This might also explain why other
countries have continued to use funds statements when they
were not employed in France until the 1950s. From that point
forward, the financial interest of paying lower taxes trumped
the rationale of concealing “new works.” Blended accounting
(charging to reserves, amortizing bonds, recording assets as expenses, etc.) disappeared in favor of a normalization of accounting through fiscal criteria [Praquin, 2006].
Focused squarely on measuring the significant impact of
“new works” on economic and financial performance, SEF
analysts unfortunately did not recognize the theoretical scope of
their analytical framework which exceeded the restrictive limits
it had been assigned. Historical research therefore enables us to
bring these anonymous precursors of financial analysis out of
the shadows and to pay our respects to the contemporary relevance of the concepts they developed.
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APPENDIX I
Measuring Cash Flows: From the CL (1870s) to the
French Plan Comptable Général, 1982
C.L.: ∆ Ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.]
C.T.: ∆ WCR + ∆ NT
– ∆ GNWC
(Excluding external
financing and cash flows
from operating activities)

= G.O.P. – [V.A. – V.I. + B.Y.] = T.N.P.
= CFOA – V.A.

Where: C.L.: Crédit Lyonnais
C.T.: current transposition
∆ Ex. W.C.: Variation in excess working capital.
D.P.F.Y.: Dividend paid out during the financial year
I.C.: Increase in Capital
S.F.A.: Sale of fixed assets
N.W.: New Works
G.O.P.: Gross operating profit
V.A.: Various amortizations
V.I.: Various inflows
B.Y.: Bond yields
T.N.P.: Total net profit
WCR: Working Capital
			 Requirement
GNWC = Global Net Working Capital
NT: Net Treasury
CFOA = Cash flows from operating activities
Comments:
1. Entries in bold type bring out the basic points highlighted by the concepts of the Crédit
Lyonnais or by the French Plan Comptable Général 1982.
2. Insofar as:
• The current financing statement includes variations in long-term external financing,
which was virtually nonexistent during that era due to the preference for internal
financing, except in several industrial sectors; the comparison above is totally possible. Also, the Crédit Lyonnais sometimes “relegated” this external financing to the
excess working capital; so it was already balanced out.
• Calculated expenditure and products are virtually nonexistent and cash flows from
operating activities and total net profit tend to be confused.
3. In France, there is a formula to analyse the financial balance of any company which is:
• (Inventories + Accounts receivable) – Accounts payable = Working Capital Requirement (WCR).
• Treasury in assets – Bank overdrafts = Net Treasury (NT).
• (Equity + Long Term Liabilities) – Fixed Assets = Global Net Working Capital
(GNWC)
Then: WCR + NT = GNWC.
4. Variations in WCR and in NT are equal to the variation in GNWC; by deducting this
same variation from GNWC (excluding external financing), with deduction of cash flows
from operating activities, cash flows logically match up to operating activities. The sole
purpose of this tautology is to show that the Crédit Lyonnais was handling concepts that
were very close to ‘ours’ but with very different outcomes – measurement of liquidity and
of the inflowing income and not calculation of a financial balance based on the excess of
stable resources (that is liabilities).
Notes on calculations:
Detail of the calculation: the breakdown is carried out using the “calculation of net profits
through the SEF method” [Excess Working Capital]”  and the “profit and loss account set
up according to the SEF method”  from which the net accounting incomes are equal:
: ∆ Excess Working Capital (∆ Ex. W.C.) – Statutory royalties and gratuities + Dividend
paid out in the financial year (D.P.F.Y.) – Increase in the capital (I.C.) – Sale of fixed assets
(S.F.A.) + New works carried over as an increase in fixed assets (N.W.F.A.) = Total net profit
(T.N.P.)
: (Gross) operating profit (G.O.P.) – New Works charged to Expenses (N.W.E.) – Various
amortizations (V.A.) + Various inflows (V.I.) – Bond yields (B.Y.) – Statutory royalties and
gratuities = Profits and losses = Total net profit (T.N.P.).
Which enables us to write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. = G.O.P. – N.W.E. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
We may also write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. + N.W.E. = G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.]
= G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
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